Redesigning the Dragon Financial Reform in the Peoples Republic of China

Redesigning the Dragon

Financial Reform in the Peoples Republic of China

V550, Government Finance in the Transitional Economies

21 November, 1996

In 1978, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) embarked on the enormous
undertaking of opening its doors to the outside world. Until this point
in time, the PRC had relied on a centralized economic system much like
that of the former Soviet Union. However, the PRC’s situation differed
with the former Soviet Union in three substantial ways 1) although
reforms followed the Cultural Revolution (which did exact its toll on
the Chinese economy) there was an absence of severe macroeconomic crises
when reforms were begun 2) agricultural infrastructure was good,
although the incentives were poor and 3) China had a strong presence
of overseas Chinese and Hong Kong that influence its economic
development and over the years supplied capital and human resources.

The industrialization strategy adopted by the PRC has been
characterized by gradualism and experimentation. Its focus has been to
introduce market forces, reduce mandatory planning, decentralize, and
open the economy to foreign investment and trade. This strategy had
three main stages. The first (1979-1983) established four “Special
Economic Zones” (areas awarded special freedoms to conduct business
relatively free of the authorities intervention) in Guangdong and Fujian
provinces, the second (1984-1987) added 14 port cities creating the
“Economic Development Zones”, and finally the third stage (1988-present)
which opened most of the country to foreign trade and created “tariff
free zones”. In the rural areas, land reforms spearheaded further
reforms and also the establishment of Township and Village Enterprises
(TVEs). These enterprises were able to capitalize on the abundant cheap
labor in rural areas and to operate without the burden of providing
social spending. They also provided a training ground for the learning
of market skills and concepts. Today, production of manufactured goods
by rural and township enterprise is estimated to account for more than
40% of the GDP.

In many respects, China’s process of economic reform has been highly
successful.

Since its inception, the average GDP growth has been a world-leading
9.3% year, the poverty rate has declined 60%, and 170 million Chinese
living in absolute poverty have seen their standard of living raised
above the minimum poverty level. Export growth was 7.8% in 1993, 29% in
1994 and 34.7% in 1995. Government measures to control inflation, which
had threatened to overheat the economy in the early 1990s, seem to have
taken effect: inflation was under 15% in 1995. (See Tables 1 and 2.)

Table 1.

Source: EIU Country Report, China/Mongolia, 3rd Quarter 1996. The
Economist Intelligence Unit.

Table 2.

Source: EIU Country Report, China/Mongolia, 3rd Quarter 1996. The
Economist Intelligence Unit.

Chinese economic reform has one other characteristic that sets it apart
from that of the former Soviet Union, the absence of democratic reforms.
The current transition is being carried out within the “socialist
framework” and for the most part is centrally controlled. Much of the
world waited to see whether the economic transition would derail after
the Tiananmen incident in 1989; it did not. However China did seem to be
looking for a way of separating itself from reforms and democratic
upheaval that were happening in the former Soviet Union. In 1992, Deng
Xiao Ping toured the southern economic zones – a journey significant for
its highly symbolic approval of the reform and investment efforts he
witnessed – and coined the phrase “socialist market economy”. Deng
emphasized that this transition must promote the development of
productivity, strengthen the national power and improve people’s
standard of living, stating that, “..with all these achievements secure,
our socialist foundation is greatly strengthened..”.

Within this backdrop, we will take a closer look at the system of
reforms currently underway in the People’s Republic of China. This year
marks the beginning of the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-2000). Examining
the individual parts (the budget process, public expenditure, taxes,
banking, the interaction between central and provincial governments, and
the emerging need to transform the social safety net) will present a
clearer picture of what has been accomplished by the macroeconomic
reforms put in place in 1976 as well as what still needs to be done.

Revenue, Expenditure and the Budget

One problem of major proportion facing the Chinese government is that
central government revenues are growing at a much slower rate than the
overall economy, and a growing budget deficit has resulted (see Table 3
in Appendix, page 20). This is especially debilitating in the face of
increasing demands from the surging economy for investment in
infrastructure and with the need for investment in a reformed social
insurance system that will come with economic disruptions caused by
continuing liberalization. Expenditures have also been falling as a
percentage of GDP, but are growing faster than revenue.

Several factors have been identified in the shrinking
revenue-to-expenditures ratio problem:

Revenue

Tax arrears on the industrial and commercial tax (CICT) from
enterprises, which are growing as state-owned enterprises (SOEs) become
more unprofitable in the face of increasing competition. At the end of
1994, these arrears amounted to 8.2 billion yuan (Y), and just seven
months later, the figure had grown to Y17.9 bn.

Tax exemptions granted by local governments to state-owned and private
enterprises.

Expenditures

Subsidies to the loss-making SOEs, in the form of loans or direct
subsidies (see Table 4). China’s 1995 budget deficit was around a mere
1.5% of GDP. If policy lending by centrally controlled banks – most of
which is, effectively, transfers to SOEs which can never afford to pay
back these loans – is taken into account, the central government’s true
deficit is 6% of GDP or higher.

Price subsidies. (Most of these were for urban food, and adjustments
made in 1992 have reduced this drain on the budget.)

Higher than expected increases in expenditures (in 1995, these were 18%
higher than planned on the central level, with local government
expenditures over 30% higher than in 1994.)

A drop of 10.7% in customs revenue from 1994 to 1995.

Inflation-indexed interest subsidies on bank deposits and treasury
bonds, which have been kept high by high inflation rates.

Table 4.

Source: Wong, Christine P.W., Christopher Heady, and Wing T. Woo.
Fiscal Management and Economic Reform in the People’s Republic of China.
Oxford University Press. Hong Kong: 1995.

For a country controlled by a Communist party, the government’s
proportion of economic activity has been remarkably small, even before
implementation of reform. In 1995, official government spending was
just 11.6% of GDP. Off-the-books revenue raising schemes by local
governments may mean the state’s total revenue is two times the official
level.

The extra-budgetary revenue investment was dispersed, uncoordinated and
did not fulfill the central government’s investment priorities. The
central government faced growing infrastructure demands, but with
shrinking (in proportionate terms) assets available, has been forced to
reduce capital construction spending substantially. Also, expenditures
on administration, culture, education, and welfare increased over the
reform period, and reduced the government’s ability to spend on
infrastructure. (See Table 5 in Appendix, page 22.) The increases in
administration spending are particularly troubling, because of
government policies to reduce control of the economy and shrink some
government bureaus.

One of the stated goals of the Ninth Five-Year Plan is to eliminate the
budget deficit by year 2000. But this goal is highly unlikely to be
achieved due to other conflicting goals, like spurring employment, which
may mean increasing subsidies to unprofitable SOEs; reducing regional
income disparities; and strengthening agriculture, which is seen as a
key to controlling inflation.

Christine Wong, an expert on the Chinese financial system, identifies
three necessary changes to restore the health of the budget: First, the
tax administration must be strengthened. Second, the tax structure must
be reformed so that it is neutral across products and sectors. Third,
the revenue-sharing system between local, provincial and national levels
of government must be revamped, with clearer tax assignments in line
with each levels set of responsibilities. The central government’s
control over the tax system and share of total revenues will likely have
to be increased. The next two sections will address these proposed
changes.

Taxation

The Pre-Reform Tax System

Prior to economic reforms, China’s tax structure was based on the
Soviet model. Enterprises remitted their profit to the government,
retaining only what was necessary to pay expenses. Revenues were
collected by local governments, and a certain amount was filtered up to
the central government. In 1984, this was replaced by a system of
enterprise income taxation reform, in which companies were taxed on
their profits, as the government tried to respond to economic imbalances
created by the emerging private sector. The turnover tax (the
Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Tax, or CICT), which had been the
largest contributor to the government’s annual revenue, was replaced
with a business tax, a product tax, and a value-added tax (VAT). These
featured highly differentiated tax rates across sectors, types of good
and service, and form of firm ownership. Most private firms paid a base
tax rate of 33%, while most state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were
nominally taxed at 55%. In practice, however, taxes paid were governed
by a contract responsibility system (CRS), in which enterprises
negotiated individually with local government units. This system
created conflict of interest because often the local government was both
tax collector and enterprise owner. Not only were there differentiated
rates which distort economic activity, there was little incentive for
full tax remittance back to the central government under this system.
(See Table 6 in Appendix, page 23, for a description of the tax
structure from 1985-1991.)

1994 Reforms

In 1994, the Chinese government began to respond to these problems by
enacting a series of reforms. The CICT was abolished and the following
taxes were created or modified:

Enterprise Income Tax. This unified corporation tax taxes companies at
a single 33% rate. Foreign enterprises and joint ventures are still
enjoying lighter tax burdens, because of the fierce competition between
regions to attract foreign investment, but these privileges are to be
gradually eliminated.

Personal Income Tax. Operates on a sliding scale, with a maximum of
45%. Not yet comprehensively-implemented.

Value-Added Tax (VAT). Replaces the product tax of the CICT. Most
goods taxed at 17%, but agricultural and food products will be taxed at
13%, and small-scale businesses will pay flat rate of 6%.

Consumption (Excise). Focuses narrowly on “luxury goods:” tobacco,
alcohol, gasoline, and a few others.

Business tax for services. Service industries will face a business tax
of 3% to 20% on sales in place of the VAT. This tax also will apply to
transfer of intangible assets and the sale of real estate.

Capital Gains. A capital gains tax was to be introduced in 1994, but
its implementation was postponed because of concern over its adverse
impact on China’s fledgling stock markets.

1996 Reforms

In 1996, China announced plans to reduce its import tariff rate from
35.9% to 23%, while abolishing preferences for certain goods and,
importantly, eliminating exemptions from import tariffs (currently, over
80% of imports are exempt from import duties for various reasons).
This step alone should help to reduce the recent losses in customs
revenue. The Ninth Five-Year Plan also includes provisions to introduce
taxes on interest earnings and inheritances, policies designed to reduce
income disparity.

Revision of Tax Collection Structure

In order to make the above tax policy changes effective, the tax
collection system must be revamped and greatly improved. The current
structure is based on a system of revenue contracts between enterprise
and government unit, and between local and central governments. One of
the necessary reforms involves tax exemptions, which local governments
often have the authority to grant to enterprises who for one reason or
another are unable to pay their taxes. This is a fundamental weakness
in the Chinese fiscal system: local government has decision-making
authority to grant exemptions on a tax the proceeds of which may in
large part be assigned to governments above. Numerous conflicts of
interest can appear to reduce incentives to enforce the tax at the local
level.

To address these changes, China in 1994 initiated the setting up of a
centrally-managed National Tax Service. This would replace the contract
system with a national “tax system,” based on uniform rules of tax
assignment and tax sharing. Certain assignments will be assigned to
local governments, and others to central government; others will be
shared according to predetermined formulas. Interestingly, in 1995, a
special police unit was set up to protect tax collectors under this new
program.

A potential obstacle to tax reform comes from local governments.
Local governments have traditionally supported reforms. But this is
because the reforms have usually given them greater autonomy. The tax
system reforms need to restore some control over investment and spending
back to the central government, which could encounter local opposition.
Allowing local governments some discretion over local tax rates can give
them some of the autonomy they desire, and provide greater incentive for
intergovernmental cooperation.

Few reports exist at present on the implementation of these reforms.
Certainly, the spirit and scope of the reforms has been well-received by
analysts, though more changes are advocated. But it will take several
more years to determine the success of the reform of tax collection
structures at the local level.

Intergovernmental Fiscal Relationships

A product of economic reforms in transitional economies is often a
shift in intergovernmental fiscal relationships. In the transition from
centralized economy to market economy it is often from a relationship
where the local or provincial government is the receiver of the “plan”
to the local or provincial government proceeds with a greater autonomy.
The evolution of this relationship in the PRC has been very similar.
However, the provincial or local governments were at an advantage over
many other transitional economies because the Chinese system had the
following characteristics 1)local implementation capacity was already
established in the rural areas 2)China in most areas has a high ethnic
homogeneity and 3) there was much to gain by inter-province trading

The very nature of Chinese economic reforms, gradual and incremental,
allowed “scaffolding” of behavior. Partial reforms provided the
environment to learn behaviors that could then be applied to the next
level of reform. Chinese economic reform was also structured on the idea
of decentralization. The establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZs)
encouraged the local areas to develop their own strategies to attract
business and allowed them the freedom to implement the strategies. The
very earliest reforms, breaking up of farm communes, were also carried
out at the local level.

Many of the SEZs are doing very well and people living in these areas
are enjoying a higher standard of living than they had previously
enjoyed. However, tax collection still remains a difficult endeavor with
compliance at only 70%. In order to improve the poorest areas in China,
policies and programs that are able to move this revenue to the poorer
areas will be needed. This can take the form of a better accounting
system to ensure that all taxes due the central government for
infrastructure development actually arrive there.

Banking Reforms, State Owned Enterprises and the Social Safety Net

In order to put current economic reforms in perspective, understand the
recommendations made by the international economic community, and fully
address the quagmire of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), a more in depth
look at the interconnectedness of the SOEs and the banking system must
be taken. We will attempt to do just that using the context of bank
development in the PRC, monetary policy, and ongoing reforms to SOEs.

Reform of the banking system in the PRC has taken on similar
characteristics to reform in other areas: i.e., gradual and
experimental. At the beginning of reforms the financial sector in the
PRC could hardly be called a financial sector. Financial sector
development and implementation is a complex undertaking which should
include the development of institutions, instruments and markets.
Currently in the PRC, banking reform lags behind other areas of reform.
This is due to a complex array of policy decisions. No discussion of
banking reform in the PRC would be complete without an examination of
the current state of SOEs restructuring. Many macroeconomic initiatives
are being put on hold in order to bolster a failing state sector and
postpone the social upheavals that may be associated with the needed
reforms of this sector.

Background

The Central Bank was established in 1984. In 1987 two additional
universal banks were formed and non-bank financial institutions were
started. In 1988 new capital markets were formed and the secondary trade
of government bonds was allowed. In 1990 the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock
exchanges were opened. In 1992 all treasury bonds were issued through
underwriters. At the end of 1994, the PRC had a total of 13 banks (of
which 3 were specialized banks and 3 were comprehensive banks). The new
“financial system” contained 20 insurance companies, 391 trust and
investment companies and greater than 60,000 credit cooperatives that
operate in local areas.

During the summer of 1995 the central government announced a series of
new banking laws would be established. These laws were the People’s Bank
of China Law, the Commercial Banking Law, the Negotiable Instruments Law
and the Guarantee Law. Up until this time the roles of each party in the
framework of financial transaction hadn’t been clearly defined. These
laws begin to lay the comprehensive groundwork for financial
transactions. The People’s Bank of China Law which was established in
the summer of 1995 addresses the internal organization of the People’s
Bank of China, its monetary policy, its supervision and tries to
establish its autonomy from provincial and local governments (it is
still under the control of the State Council). This law has provisions
in it for setting the prime lending rate, rediscount window, amount of
funds to be lent to commercial banks, and the trade of treasury bonds,
government securities and foreign exchange. It also bars the People’s
Bank of China from financing the budget deficits of the central
government and local governments. The Commercial Banking Law addresses
the mission of commercial banks. These are still under the guidance of
the State Council and still must issue policy loans (although the law
also states that any losses due to defaults on these loans will be
compensated by the State Council).

The Negotiable Instruments Law is similar to the United States’ Uniform
Commercial Code. The Guarantee Law deals with mortgages, pledges, and
liens. Both of these laws are hoped to standardize and regulate credit
transactions in the PRC.

Monetary Policy

Monetary policy in the PRC is currently administered through a central
“credit plan”. This plan, which is administered by the State Council,
sets credit quotas for each bank and also facilitates direct bank
financing of enterprises. In the current system the major objectives of
the specialized banks is to provide loans for various projects,
agriculture and foreign trade. The main recipients of these loans are
the state owned enterprises (SOEs). The terms and rates of these loans
are very favorable (usually 12%). Therefore the demand for these loans
is higher than the supply and private companies have to rely on other
sources. This can take on various means and can often lead to
underground lending operations.

The convertibility of RMB has also been undergoing changes. Prior to
January 1, 1994, there were two money systems in China. One for local
use, the other for foreigners. These Foreign Exchange Certificates
(FEC’s) were redeemable only in state operated stores and restaurants.
Only higher level officials were able to use these and most imported
goods required the use of FEC’s. Since doing away with FEC’s , RMB
convertibility was relegated to official “swap shops”. Now, with the
correct permit businesses can use any large bank to exchange money.
However, the government has also begun to establish hard currency audits
as well as trying to force businesses to use the same bank for all of
their transactions (a way of tracking how much money is being
exchanged). The new convertibility does meet IMF requirements.

State Owned Enterprises and the Social Safety Net

As illustrated above, the banking system and state owned enterprises
are closely linked (see Table 7 in Appendix, page 24, for financing of
SOEs). According to Chinese government statistics, up to 20% of the debt
of state banks is bad debt. International estimates place this figure at
almost double that amount. Recently in Jiangsu province, 30 SOEs
declared bankruptcy telling the banks they were not going to pay their
debts. If all the banks in China did this it would lead to bankruptcy of
the banks. SOEs account for only 34% of industrial output but consume
73.5% of government investment. Most have an average debt equal to 75%
of total assets. According to an Oxford Analytica study, in the first
eight months of 1995, SOE industrial output expanded by only 8.3%
compared with a 13.7% increase for all industry. And according to
estimates, non-SOEs, on average, required less than a third as much
investment to achieve equivalent industrial output.

These are serious problems. The ninth five year economic plan
(1996-2000) places priority on their eradication, calling for SOEs to
lay off workers to boost efficiency, and encouraging SOEs to “declare
bankruptcy if their liabilities outstrip assets, if they make long-term
losses and if they lose out in market competition.” Up until now current
reforms and lessening of government controls have not only not reigned
in this problem but have also created new ones such as asset stripping
of the SOE by management, workers and local governments.

However, the central and local governments are still hesitant to shut
down even the most inefficient SOE. Currently, 7 out of 10 industrial
workers work in a SOE. The SOE provides not only a job but housing,
education, pensions, insurance and often energy sources and commodity
shops on site. The World Bank estimates that only 56% of total
expenditure by SOEs is actually on wages, the rest is on “social
spending”. Therefore, any reform involving the SOEs must also involve
reform and development of a social safety net. Pilot programs have been
started where local governments create pension pools and are putting
aside payroll taxes for education, health and unemployment benefits. It
is also important to note that the question of “social security” reform
is being worsened by additional factors. Population in the PRC is
progressively growing older. This phenomenon can be attributed to
increase in life expectancy due to better living conditions and the one
child per family policy.

How Should Reforms be Implemented?

Due to the interconnectedness of these areas of society, many of these
reforms need to be implemented simultaneously. In May of this year the
World Bank published a Country Study that attempts to address these
issues. The following are proposed reforms from this study.

Reduce the role of government in the directing of resources.

This over time would lesson the State Councils role in directing the
day to day functions of the banks and eventually do away with the credit
plan. Banks would be able to allocate resources appropriately and to set
their own interest rates.

Improve the Central Bank’s management of monetary aggregates.

This over time would improve the consistency of banking laws by
ensuring that they are used and would also remove policy lending from
the banks and put it into the budget where it should be. This would also
allow for the development of the Central Bank as an institution.

Transform state commercial banks into real commercial banks.

This step would help to free the banks from the current crises of bad
debt and allow them to loan money to the newly emerging private sector.

4) Improve governance, diversify ownership and lower subsidies for SOEs.

In the short term this would include implementing an accounting system
and independent audits, give autonomy to the managers, getting rid of
unviable businesses and restructuring those SOEs that can be.

Transfer social services to the government.

This would reduce the burden on newly restructured enterprises. Over
time this would allow for a national system to be implemented.

Conclusions

In comparison with other countries undergoing transition from
centrally-planned economic systems, China had the luxury of initiating
its reforms at a time when it faced no macroeconomic or serious
political crisis. It was able to adopt a two-track approach to economic
reform: China continued state control of existing enterprises while
loosening economic controls enough to permit growth of a new, nonstate
sector. This was possible in part because the inefficient state sector
was a small share of the economy, compared to most socialist nations.

China’s reform experience thus far has been one of “enabling” reform,
allowing “marketization” instead of forcing “privatization,” getting
government to “step out of the way” of the flows of commerce. The
results have been good to excellent in the productive sectors, but the
reform has not yet succeeded in the fiscal and monetary sectors, which
are the domains of government. Here the government can’t step out of
the way; it must build the proper tools and structures to manage these
sectors. It is in these areas, and in the efforts to reduce
administration, dismantle SOEs, and provide an adequate social insurance
system for displaced workers and affected citizens that China faces its
true reform challenges.

To further evaluate how far China has come down the path of economic
transition, we look to a definition of transition used by the World
Bank, which describes these three components:

Liberalization: freeing prices, trade and entry to markets from state
controls, while stabilizing the economy. Stabilization is an essential
component to liberalization.

Clarifying property rights and privatizing them where necessary.
Requires re-creating the institutions that support market exchange and
shape ownership, and especially the rule of law.

Reshaping social services and the social safety net to ease the pain of
transition while propelling the reform process forward.

Examination of the Chinese experience shows that liberalization has
taken place to some degree, though much reform of prices, trade and
markets is still to be done. However, privatization and the assignment
of property rights are still very undeveloped, and the most difficult
parts of transition ahead are dependent on a still-unachieved transfer
of the social safety net from enterprise-based to government control.

Were China to continue to grow at the rates of the last two decades, it
would surpass the United States as the world’s largest economy in less
than twenty years. Though some tapering off in the growth rate is
expected, China, with its sheer size and dynamism, is emerging as one of
the world’s economic powers. The reform policy choices it makes during
this period of transition thus have not only domestic but international
significance, as China’s domestic economic and social stability will be
felt internationally. The rest of the world has ample reason for
assisting China in seeing these reforms through peacefully. Opening of
economic activity within China and with the rest of the world will
assist the process of political liberalization within the country, and
will provide enhanced regional and global security.

Table 3. The Fiscal Situation in the Reform Period

Source: Wong, Christine P.W., Christopher Heady, and Wing T. Woo.
Fiscal Management and Economic Reform in the People’s Republic of China.
Oxford University Press. Hong Kong: 1995, p.24.Table 5. Government
Budgetary Expenditures

Source: Wong, Christine P.W., Christopher Heady, and Wing T.
Woo. Fiscal Management and Economic Reform in the People’s
Republic of China. Oxford University Press. Hong Kong: 1995,
p.24.

Table 6. Composition of Tax Revenues

Source: Wong, Christine P.W., Christopher Heady, and Wing T. Woo.
Fiscal Management and Economic Reform in the People’s Republic of China.
Oxford University Press. Hong Kong: 1995, p.24.

Table 7. Changing Role of the State

Source: Harrold, Peter. China’s Reform Experience to Date. World Bank
Discussion Papers #180. The World Bank:Washington, DC. 1992.

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Wong, Christine. “China’s Economy: The Limits of Gradualist Reform.”
in China Briefing, 1994, ed. by William A. Joseph. Westview Press.
Boulder, CO: 1994

Stevenson-Yang, Anne. “New Reforms and Taxes for ‘94,” in The China
Business Review. U.S.-China Business Council. Washington, D.C.:
January-February 1994.

Peck, Joyce, Peter Kung, and Khoon-Ming Ho. “Enter the VAT,” in The
China Business Review. U.S.-China Business Council. Washington, D.C.:
March-April 1994.

“China: Tax Policy Changes May Not Be Welcome to Companies, But Are
Good for China,” in Global Economic Forum. Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc.
1995.

Wong, Christine P.W., Christopher Heady, and Wing T. Woo. Fiscal
Management and Economic Reform in the People’s Republic of China.
Oxford University Press. Hong Kong: 1995.

IWR Daily Update. Vol. 2, No. 104, 25 April 1995.

Harrold, Peter “China’s Reform Experience to Date” World Bank
Discussion Paper #180, 1992.

Mehran and Quintyn, “Financial Sector Reform in China” Finance and
Development, March 1996.

Ibid.

Tseng, W et al. “Economic reform in China: A New Phase” , IMF
Occasional Paper #114, November 1994.

The Chinese Economy: Fighting Inflation, Deepening Reforms World Bank
Country Study Washington, DC, May 1996.

Ibid

Xu, Dianqing “China: Contradictory Measures Frustrate Bank Reform”
Center for International Private Enterprise, Washington DC, 1995.

Mehran and Quintyn, “Financial Sector Reforms in China” Finance and
Development, March 1996.

Ibid.

Xu, Dianqing “China: Contradictory Measures Frustrate Bank Reform”
Center for International Private Enterprise, 1995.

Forney and Sender “Ever So Careful: China cautiously extends the
renminbi’s convertibility” Far Eastern Economic Review, July 4, 1996.

Ibid.

“Passing the Buck” Far Eastern Economic Review, October 10, 1996.

Ibid.

The Chinese Economy: Fighting Inflation, Deepening Reforms. A World
Bank Country Study May, 1996.

Forney, Matt “Trials by Fire” Far Eastern Economic Review, September
12, 1996.

“Reform of China’s State-Owned Enterprises: A Progress Report of Oxford
Analytica.” World Bank Web Page, November 16, 1996
(http://www.worldbank.org/html/prddr/trans/dec95/china.htm)

Macartney, Jane. “Focus – China Unveils 5-Year Plan Low on Initiative.”
Reuters Financial Service. March 5, 1996. Available through
Lexis/Nexis ASIAPC library, China file.

Ibid.

The Chinese Economy: Fighting Inflation, Deepening Reforms. A World
Bank Country Study, May 1996.

Wong, Christine. “China’s Economy: The Limits of Gradualist Reform.”
in China Briefing, 1994, ed. by William A. Joseph. Westview Press.
Boulder, CO: 1994, p. 51.

“World Development Report Stresses Benefits of Sustained, Continued
Reforms.” World Bank News, Vol. XV, No. 25. June 27, 1996.

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