Реферат з англійської мови

Interethnic Relations and Ethnic Tolerance in Ukraine.

InDepth Analytical Report HYPERLINK
«file:///C:\\Documents%20and%20Settings\\BG\\Рабочий%20стол\\politicon.i
atp.org.ua\\paninarelat.htm» \l «1#1» [1]

The transition from Isolationist (territorial, social, and mental)
principles of social system functioning to principles of openness and
cooperation is one of the most important preconditions of transforming a
closed (traditionalcommunitarian or totalitarian) society into an open
democratic society HYPERLINK
«file:///C:\\Documents%20and%20Settings\\BG\\Рабочий%20стол\\politicon.i
atp.org.ua\\paninarelat.htm» \l «2#2» [2] .

A certain level of tolerance towards members of various social groups,
to which an individual does not belong, is a psychological basis of any
social partnership.

In a situation of heightened social tension (caused by an economic slump
and a struggle of different political forces for power), tolerance of
members of one ethnic group towards other ethnic groups is regarded as a
most important factor, if not of societal stabilization then, at least
of prevention of civil war or murderous interethnic clashes, which a
number of republics of the FSU (Azerbaidzhan, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova,
Tadzhikistan, Kirgizstan, Uzbekistan, the Ossetiyaningushetian conflict
in Russia) failed to avoid.

Numerous sociological polls, conducted by the central Ukrainian branch
of the AllUnion Centre for Public Opinion Research and the Institute for
Sociology with Ukraine’s National Academy of Sciences in 1989–1991,
included some questions which touched, to a varying degree, upon
problems of interethnic relations. The data obtained did not reveal any
widespread pronounced nationalist attitudes among the population of most
regions of Ukraine. Despite this, however, and despite the absence of
outbursts of interethnic strife in Ukraine, public opinion polls
typically register a hrefigh level of anxiety among the population about
the possibility of interethnic conflict: in all the polls on issues of
utmost concern for the population, the problem of likely interethnic
feuds figured most prominently among stresscausing factors.

The peak of concern about possible interethnic conflicts was registered
in 1992, when almost half of Ukraine’s adult population (49%) named the
possibility of interethnic conflicts as one of the major problems they
were most apprehensive of. At the same time, the share of people who
found themselves involved in conflicts triggered by disrespect for
national/ethnic dignity, remained at the same level (about 3%).
Discrepancies between the extent of personal experience of interethnic
confrontation and the growth of concern about possible interethnic
conflict seem to be explained, first and foremost, by outbreaks of
interethnic strife in other regions of the former Soviet Union rather
than by the way interethnic conflicts developed in Ukraine and policies
pursued by the leadership with regard to ethnic groups. However, in
order to prognosticate possible paths of development of interethnic
relations in Ukraine and, most importantly, to be able to spot in
advance probable factors of heightened interethnic tensions, one should
have much more evidence than some fragmentary data obtained in response
to a few individual questions, included, as a rule, into prompt topical
public opinion polls on the most urgent problems.

1. Ethnic Tolerance Measuring Procedure

An indepth analysis of the problem presupposes special methods which
make it possible to measure the level of general ethnic/national
tolerance as an underlying psychological basis of interethnic behavior.
One of such methods is Bogardus’ social distance HYPERLINK
«file:///C:\\Documents%20and%20Settings\\BG\\Рабочий%20стол\\politicon.i
atp.org.ua\\paninarelat.htm» \l «3#3» [3] . It allows the measurement
of a person’s social attitude towards members of other ethnic groups and
nationalities — a certain psychological predisposition to affiliate with
or, conversely, to alienate from other ethnic groups or nationalities,
irrespective of their personal qualities and peculiarities HYPERLINK
«file:///C:\\Documents%20and%20Settings\\BG\\Рабочий%20стол\\politicon.i
atp.org.ua\\paninarelat.htm» \l «4#4» [4] . A respondent’s answer to
the question of the capacity in which he/she is ready to accept
representatives of other ethnic groups or nationalities makes it
possible to determine a measure of social distance he/she would per to
be preserved between herself or himself and the group in question.

The scale is organized on a cumulative principle, which allows one to
determine the index (in points) of social distance visavis a certain
ethnic group or nationality: “ready to accept them as members of the
family” — one point, “as a close friend” two points, “as a neighbor” —
three points, “as a fellowworker” — four points, “as a resident of the
country” — five points, “as a tourist/visitor” — six points, “I would
not admit them to Ukraine at all” — seven points. Thus, one point
signifies maximum tolerance, while seven points signifies extreme
intolerance.

Using a list of 23 nationalities, the authors applied the Bogardus
social distance scale in two studies (in Kiev in August 1990 and in July
1991), the outcomes of which confirmed the reliability of the
information obtained by means of this method HYPERLINK
«file:///C:\\Documents%20and%20Settings\\BG\\Рабочий%20стол\\politicon.i
atp.org.ua\\paninarelat.htm» \l «5#5» [5] .

A special study of ethnic tolerance of Ukraine’s population was
undertaken in April 1992 and in May 1994 using the Bogardus scale. The
two studies used a national sample of Ukraine’s adult population (over
18 years old; the calculated sample size was 1800 people, representative
of regions {oblasts} of residence), types of settlement (town/village),
nationality/ethnic group and educational level of Ukraine’s adult
population as a whole.

The list of ethnic groups/nationalities, presented to respondents for
evaluation in April 1992, included 16 groups: Ukrainians, Russians,
Belarussians, Jews, a number of nationalities of the former USSR
republics, Western and Eastern European, Asian and African countries, as
well as Ukrainians living abroad (expatriates in the Ukrainian
diaspora).

In May 1994 the list was somewhat modified by excluding a number of
ethnic groups/nationalities which were of no political interest for the
monitoring of attitudes and including some nationalities/ethnic groups
living along Ukraine’s borders whose attitudes were of practical
interest for political decisionmaking purposes — namely Moldavians,
Serbians, Turks and Slovaks.

2. Attitudes of Ukraine’s Population towards Various
Nationalities/Ethnic Groups

Attitudes of Ukraine’s adult population towards members of various
ethnic groups/ nationalities in 1992 (i.e., half a year after Ukraine
became an independent state) can generally be characterized as being
orientated towards national/ethnic isolation (Table 1):

Table 1

Social distance visagrave;vis various ethnic groups/nationalities as
evaluated by Ukraine’s population (April 1992): “I agree to accept
members of the given ethnic group/nationality as..”

1: members of my family, 2: close friends; 3: neighbours; 4: colleagues
at work; 5: inhabitants of Ukraine; 6: visitors of Ukraine; 7: I would
not allow them into Ukraine at all

Level of Tolerance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Index

Ukrainians 79 9 3 1 7 2 0 1.55

Russians 43 24 10 3 11 7 2 2.46

Belarussians 29 27 14 4 13 12 1 2.85

Ukrainian expatriates 24 22 7 4 18 23 2 3.48

Poles 15 22 14 4 12 28 5 3.77

Jews 10 14 15 11 23 18 10 4.18

Hungarians 9 14 17 5 15 35 4 4.24

Americans 11 13 9 15 10 38 4 4.31

Germans 8 13 9 16 12 37 5 4.43

French 9 13 8 13 11 41 4 4.45

Romanians g 12 13 6 14 38 8 4.56

Japanese 4 11 9 19 9 43 4 4.66

Crimean Tatars 3 6 9 5 31 29 17 5.09

Georgians 3 8 9 5 16 34 26 5.26

Vietnamese 2 7 6 9 10 52 14 5.29

Arabs 3 6 5 7 11 51 17 5.37

Negroes 2 6 5 6 11 50 20 5.49

Gypsies 3 4 7 3 22 26 35 5.55

 (% of all those polled; N = 1752)

The data obtained made it possible to answer one question raised as a
result of previous research, i.e., why, despite a generally favourable
situation in the sphere of interethnic relations, a considerable part of
the population is still fearful of interethnic conflicts? If, casting a
cursory glance at Table I, one makes an attempt to succinctly
characterize the population’s psychological status in the sphere of
interethnic relations, then the word ‘guarded’ seems to be most
appropriate. In neither ethnic group/nationality, including the
indigenous one, can we observe a maximum (100%) manifestation of
tolerance: only 79% of those polled chose to accept Ukrainians as family
members, and less than a half of the respondents –Russians.

An analysis of the distribution of ethnic groups/nationalities on the
social distance scale according to the ethnic intolerance index (see the
far right column in Table 1 ) leads us to conclude that there is a
certain striving for East Slavic separateness in the minds of Ukrainian
people: Ukrainians, Russians, Belarussians, Poles and Ukrainian
expatriates (the diaspora) have an index value of less than four points
on the social distance scale, which may testify if not to a pronounced
tolerance then, at least, to some positive value for it.

A number of nationalities are characterized by an intolerance index of
more than five 5 points, which means, specifically, that representatives
of these nationalities are not accepted in people’s minds as permanent
residents of Ukraine. A list of nationalities which are rejected most of
all (Crimean Tatars, Georgians, Arabs, Negroes, Gypsies and the
Vietnamese) may lead one to surmise that the underlying reason for such
rejection is an association in people’s minds of these nationalities
with a threat of international or interethnic conflicts. Thus, a fear of
interethnic/international clashes is, in our opinion, a result of
general cautiousness as a basic character trait of Ukraine’s population,
rather than an indication of ethnic/national intolerance. It is probably
this same guardedness that on the one hand helps avoid largescale
interethnic confrontation and, on the other, facilitates the formation
of a certain (as it were, ‘soft’) type of xenophobia, separation from
all ‘aliens’. That is precisely why ethnic Ukrainians abroad (Ukrainian
expatriates, on whom many people in Ukraine pinned great hopes for
assisting them in building up independent Ukraine’s economy) occupy in
the minds of people in Ukraine a more remote place than Russians or
Belarussians, and have an index of more than three points, which is
beyond the range of the closest (friendly, neighbourly or family) ties.

In this context (the shaping of national isolation psychology),
representatives of most nationalities are accepted in people’s minds
only as visitors to Ukraine.

Of certain interest for an analysis of ethnic/national intolerance is
the position of Jews on the scale of social distance. By virtue of
historical circumstances) the problem of antiSemitism has a special if
not leading place in the range of the world’s problems in the field of
international/interethnic relations. Historically, this issue was one of
the most important interethnic problems in Ukraine. It is rather topical
even nowadays, since it is closely linked with the problems of human
rights protection, migration and international cooperation.

The results of international/interethnic tolerance measurements made it
possible to see that problem in a somewhat different light. If
previously this had been a matter of antiSemitism as such, with an
emphasis on the negative attitude towards Jews alone, a comparison of
attitudes to Jews with attitudes to other nationalities leads one to
conclude that antiSemitism is just one particular manifestation of a
more general xenophobia — rejection of practically all nationalities or
ethnic groups different from one’s own: Jews far from occupy a leading
place. Moreover, on the scale of social distance they are placed much
closer in the mass consciousness of Ukraine’s population than most other
nationalities/ethnic groups. When considering the data on Ukraine as a
whole, Jews are placed in the group of nationalities, which are ‘driven
out’ by the mass consciousness beyond the range of close contacts (four
points). This, however, mainly occurs because of the attitudes of rural
and small town dwellers, for whom Jews as well as most other
nationalities are rather ‘alien’. In Kiev, however, the index of
intolerance to Jews is less than four points (3.44 points), in other big
cities (with more than 250,000 thousand inhabitants each) it is 3.67
points, while in small towns – 4.25 points and in villages – 4.56 points
(all differences are significant at least at the level of 0.05, and
between the extreme groups — at the level of 0.001).

This concrete example is a vivid illustration of the conclusion that
people consider as ‘friendly’ those nationalities or ethnic groups with
whom they have lived together for a long time on this territory. This
frame of mind, lecting an a priori mistrust of practically all
nations/ethnic groups that have not lived for a long time on this
territory, is typical of the value system of a closed
traditionalistarchaic society. Widespread traditionalistcommunitarian
values are an essential obstacle in the course of the democratic
transformation of society.

A low level of ethnic/national tolerance, manifested with regard to
certain ethnic groups/nationalities, is but one manifestation of a low
level of general ethnic/national tolerance. It is primarily a matter of
xenophobia which became a real fact of life in Ukrainian society during
the collapse of the totalitarian system, when the ‘genie’ of intolerance
and distrust with regard to ‘aliens’ and other special groups or strata
as well as to other ethnic groups and nationalities broke loose from the
shackles of Communist ideology and allround suppression of dissidence.

This conclusion is confirmed by the results of a factor analysis of the
data. Factorization made it possible to single out three major factors
which, combined, determined 82% of the variance in assessments. The
first factor (its explanatory force was 66%) may be interpreted as the
factor of ‘East Slavic withdrawal’, for only on the scales of
assessments of Ukrainians, Russians and Belarussians were no high factor
loads registered with respect to national intolerance. In other words,
if someone shows intolerance towards a certain ethnic group/nationality,
it is very probable that he/she will show intolerance towards most other
nationalities or ethnic groups not considered by him or her as ‘friendly
people’. There is also another definition of the factor dominant in the
minds of people, namely xenophobia.

The second and third factors are far weaker in their explanatory power
(12.3% and 4.4% respectively) and characterize, in our (optimistic)
opinion, a potentially positive element in the people’s minds. The
second factor may be termed the factor of ‘general ethnic/national
tolerance’, since it includes high negative values for factor loads of
those ethnic groups or nationalities which are rejected most of all by
the mass consciousness. The structure of the third factor ‘orientation
towards the West’ — includes only those scales with high negative loads
which characterize attitudes to representatives of developed Western
countries. It is precisely these two factors, as yet rather weak but
still present in the minds of people, that give us some hope for better
prospects of the development of the system attitudes of Ukraine’s
population towards representatives of other ethnic groups/nationalities.

On the one hand, the population’s general cautiousness and guardedness,
rather vividly manifested in the rejection of nationalities and ethnic
groups whose image is in some way associated in the mass consciousness
with interethnic and international conflicts, work towards the
preservation of a more or less durable peace in Ukraine at a time when
other regions of the former Soviet Union are plagued with murderous
interethnic feuds. On the other hand, such overcautiousness is also
leading to the creation and consolidation of a prospectless (from the
point of view of building up an economically developed civilized nation)
phenomenon of general national and ethnic intolerance, originating from
a psychological isolation from practically all nationalities and ethnic
groups which do not have a long historical record of living on the
territory of Ukraine.

3. General Ethnic/National Intolerance

The phenomenon of xenophobia (established as a result of the correlation
and factor analysis), the essence of which lies in the fact that
manifestations of intolerance towards certain specific nationality or
ethnic group are merely a special case of manifestation of more general
ethnic/national intolerance, substantiate the expediency of using such
an indicator as the general ethnic/national intolerance index. This
index is a simple average of values of ethnic/national intolerance
indicators. In calculating a simple average value of the index of
general ethnic/national intolerance, attitudes towards ethnic Russians
and Ukrainians as the major nationalities living on the territory of
Ukraine, as well as attitudes towards Ukrainian expatriates, are not
taken into account since they are representatives of the same
nationalities as the indigenous population.

According to the data obtained, the general ethnic/national intolerance
index of Ukraine’s adult population in 1992 was 4.63 points on a seven
points scale, where the value of 4 points is a mark dividing positive
(tolerant) and negative (intolerant) attitudes to other
nationalities/ethnic groups. One can see that the general
national/ethnic tolerance of Ukraine’s population has shifted to the
negative end of the scale, for which reason it would be more exact to
speak about a general national intolerance. Analyzing the factors
affecting the phenomenon in question, one can maintain that a factor’s
influence is positive, even if it only reduces the average level of
general intolerance, rather than increasing tolerance.

4. SocioDemographic Factors of General Ethnic Intolerance

Our analysis of sociodemographic factors of ethnic intolerance makes it
possible to empirically verify the hypothesis that educational level,
age and type of settlement substantially affect the level of ethnic
tolerance: the higher the individual’s educational level and the younger
he/she is, the lower the level of general intolerance. Place of
residence affects not only attitudes towards Jews, as was mentioned
above, but also a general ethnic intolerance index (Table 2):

Table 2

Levels of ethnic intolerance of various sociodemographic groups of
Ukraine’s population

  Index of overall national intolerance (on a scale from 1–7)

Ukraine’s population as a whole 4.63

AGE

under 30 years 4.40

30–55 years 4.65

over 55 years 4.89

EDUCATION

Incomplete secondary 4.91

Complete general secondary 4.61

Specialized secondary 4.58

Higher 4.38

TYPE OF SETTLEMENT

Kiev 4.1

Large city 4.40

Small city 4.62

Village 4.86

REGION

Kiev 4.1

the West 4.31

the Center 4.87

the East 4.71

the South 4.71

the Crimea 4.63

ETHNIC GROUP

Ukrainians 4.69

Ethnic Russians 4.52

Others 4.43

According to the 1992 data, regional peculiarities are as follows: the
lowest level of general ethnic/national intolerance was registered in
the western region, while the highest level was in the central region,
which confirms the hypothesis that a level of national/ethnic tolerance
is influenced by the experience of ethnic groups/nationalities living
together and cooperating with other ethnic groups/nations. Poles,
Hungarians, Romanians and other ethnic groups living in Ukraine are
largely concentrated on the territory of the western region, while the
central region is more homogeneous in its ethnic composition.
Furthermore, joint ventures and business contacts intensified in the
first years of the new, marketoriented economic policy, and were more
developed in Western Ukraine. There is another explanation for the lower
level of general ethnic intolerance in Western Ukraine: in our opinion,
the region’s population was oriented to market transformations in the
economy to a greater extent, and, as will be shown below, market
orientations are rather closely related to a lower level of ethnic
intolerance.

Certain differences in the level of ethnic intolerance were registered
between Ukrainians and ethnic Russians: in 1992 Ukrainians’ general
ethnic intolerance was somewhat higher (see Table 1 ; the difference is
significant at the level of 0.05).

5. Ethnic Specifics of National Intolerance

The data obtained make it possible to specify differences between
Ukrainians and ethnic Russians living in Ukraine with regard to their
attitudes towards various ethnic groups/nationalities. Table 3 shows the
results of the research for the following indicators:

• the left columns represent maximum tolerance of various
ethnic/national groups — the percentage of representatives of the ethnic
group in question who expressed their readiness to have close relations
with representatives of the given nationality;

• the right columns show indicators of national/ethnic intolerance of
each nationality/ethnic group (on a seven point scale):

Table 3

Attitudes of Russians and Ukrainians towards representatives of various
nationalities/ethnic groups

Nationality Ready to accept representatives of this nationality as
related through marriage Index of intolerance towards this nationality
(on a scale from 1–7)

  Ethnic Russians Ukrainians Ethnic Russians Ukrainians

Ukrainians 69 84 1.66 1.47**

Russians 67 34 1.82 2.64**

Belarussians 38 25 2.62 2.92**

Ukrainian expatriates 18 25 3.75 3.39**

Poles 17 15 3.75 3.79

Jews 14 7 3.88 4.30**

Hungarians 12 8 4.11 4.32

Americans 12 11 4.15 4.37*

Germans 12 7 4.20 4.51**

French 12 8 4.22 4.54**

Romanians 10 6 4.50 4.61

Japanese 5 4 4.52 4.72*

Crimean Tatars 4 3 4.91 5.16**

Georgians 4 3 5.06 5.37**

Vietnamese 3 2 5.29 5.30

Arabs 6 2 5.29 5.51

Negroes     5.46 5.51

Gypsies 3 3 5.51 5.60

(* p <0.05; ** p < 0.01) Two regularities are very conspicuous in the data. Firstly, all the nationalities presented for assessment were arranged both by ethnic Russians and Ukrainians in the same order of rejection. Even the position ‘Russians’ was no exception for ethnic Russians. Secondly, in practically all cases the intolerance indices of Ukrainians are higher. except in the case of their attitudes towards Ukrainians (both autochthonous and expatriates). Insignificant differences were registered in their attitudes towards Poles, Hungarians and Romanians as well as to nationalities which are rejected most of all both by ethnic Russians and Ukrainians (Vietnamese, Arabs, Negroes, Gypsies). Naturally, of the most topical interest from the point of view of preserving and maintaining civil peace in Ukraine, are attitudes of ethnic Russians and Ukrainians towards each other. Ethnic Russians are the largest ethnic minority in Ukraine. As far as their historical, political and economic role in Ukraine’s social life is concerned, they occupy one of the leading positions and the significance of their position increases dramatically in light of the prospects for solving problems in relations between Russia and Ukraine. In 1992, attitudes of ethnic Russians towards Ukrainians were, as noted above, characterized by a striving for a hrefomogeneous nation. Ethnic Russians rated Ukrainians on the scale of social distance even higher, albeit insignificantly, than their own ethnic group. This was in line with their support of the status of Ukraine as an independent (primarily in relation to Russia), sovereign state, which was demonstrated at the 1991 erendum. Underlying that orientation toward Ukraine’s political and economic independence was a widespread (at that time) assumption about Ukraine’s might and great economic potential which, so it was thought, could not be materialized because Ukraine had to support all the ‘hangerson’ of the republics of the FSU, above all Russia. With respect to the attitudes of Ukrainians towards ethnic Russians, Table 3 indicates that the latter are indeed regarded by Ukrainians on the scale of social distance as being closer to themselves than all other ethnic groups/nationalities, yet further than the autochtonous nationality. The reasons that could explain this situation are well understood: a considerable Ukrainian part of the population, having experienced a period of Russification and imperial ‘protection’, is very bitter about a possible return to the times when the Union Centre used to make decisions for Ukraine without taking its people’s interests into account. That is why suspicion with regard to Russia was carried over to ethnic Russians as a whole. As is usually the case when a question of national differences in attitudes to some social phenomenon arises, many people resort without a moment’s hesitation to generalized ethnic or national categories, e.g., ‘Russians’, ‘Ukrainians’, etc. The results of our research, conducted in spring 1992, revealed certain differences in the attitudinal system of representatives of one ethnic group towards various other ethnic groups living in different regions. To take an example, Ukrainians living in different regions of Ukraine have different attitudes towards various ethnic groups and, in particular, to ethnic Russians and Ukrainian expatriates (in the diaspora). Table 4 supplies data clearly mapping out the pattern of attitudes of ethnic Russians and Ukrainians towards each other in 1992, with due consideration of the factor of regional heterogeneity of attitudes of Ukraine’s autochtonous population. Table 4 Peculiarities of attitudes of Ukrainians living in various regions of Ukraine towards Ukrainians and ethnic Russians   Index of intolerance (on a scale from 1–7)   towards Ukrainians towards Russians towards Ukrainians living abroad Ukraine’s population as a whole 1.55 2.45 3.48 Ukrainians 1.47 2.64 3.39 Ethnic Russians 1.66 1.82 3.75 Ukrainians in various regions The western region (Galicia) 1.08 2.71 1.81 The central region 1.13 2.53 3.53 The eastern region 1.52 2.23 3.74 The southern region 1.98 3.17 3.85 The Crimea 2.29 3.24 4.29 While the group of respondents representing the Crimea’s Ukrainians was very small and can theore not be considered to represent the Ukrainian population of the region with sufficient statistical reliability, we still provide the corresponding data since they lect a general trend: ethnic Russians are rated on the scale of social distance as a group which is closer to Ukrainians than Ukrainian expatriates. Only Ukrainians in the western region are an exception to this — they rate Ukrainian expatriates closer to themselves than ethnic Russians. Thus, one can see that the sociopsychological attitudes of Ukrainians in the sphere of interethnic relations are rather different in various regions of Ukraine and this should be taken into account not only in further research but also in political decisionmaking. 6. Ethnic/National Intolerance Dynamics Results of the second round of research undertaken in May 1994 make it possible to determine and describe certain trends in the development of the ethnic/national tolerance of Ukraine’s population. In this connection the indicators of general and specific tolerance of Ukrainians and ethnic Russians towards each other are important. The level of general national/ethnic tolerance can be considered, within the context of prospects for the development of society, as an indicator of the degree of readiness of the population’s mass consciousness to open up and to cooperate with the world community on the basis of generally recognized democratic principles. At the same time, indicators of attitudes of ethnic Russians and Ukrainians towards each other are indicators of internal sociopolitical processes, the development of which can consolidate or jeopardize civil peace and accord in Ukraine. Moreover, attitudes towards ethnic Russians largely lect the population’s attitudes towards relations with Russia. Within the general political context, one cannot disregard the fact that peace in Eastern Europe will be largely determined by the course of development of relationships between Ukraine and Russia. An aggravation of the problems of the Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet, which have become major objects of confrontation between Ukraine and Russia, evokes serious concern not only among the responsible politicians of the two sides but also from the world community as a whole. The population’s support of various political actions, of both a compromising and confrontational nature, is at present an essential factor in political decisionmaking. In this connection, monitoring social moods and feelings, particularly those lected in mutual ethnic tolerance, enables one to predict to a certain extent the population’s reactions to changes in Ukrainian policy visavis Russia. Table 5 shows the dynamics of levels of general national/ethnic tolerance with respect to changes which occurred in the mass consciousness of the population in various regions of Ukraine in the past two years of the new state’s making. Table 5 Regional peculiarities of the general dynamics of national/ethnic intolerance Regions Index of overall national intolerance (on a scale from 1–7)   1992 1994 Kiev 4.01 4.49 the western region 4.31 4.33 the central region 4.87 4.25** the eastern region 4.71 4.64 the southern region 4.71 4.68 the Crimea 4.63 4.13* Ukraine 4.63 4.44** *<0.05;**<0.01 First of all, it should be noted that a certain drop occurred in the average level of general national/ethnic intolerance of the population of Ukraine as a whole. On the one hand, the level remains shifted to the negative side of the tolerance scale (whereby, as has been mentioned, the mark of four points divides the positive and negative sides of the scale). On the other hand, however, there is a statistically significant movement toward a greater general national/ethnic tolerance which testifies to a positive if slow trend in the evolution of the mass consciousness. Important changes in the level of general national/ethnic tolerance took place in the minds of people in Central Ukraine. The higher level of general national tolerance in this region shows that this formerly politically indifferent area with prevailing traditionalistarchaic orientations (where local interests supersede all other) is beginning to become rather actively involved in the political life of the country and, in some cases, to substantially influence the course of political developments. For example, the changes in the mass consciousness of the region’s population found their lection in the outcomes of the 1994 presidential elections. In the past. Central Ukraine had been fairly homogeneous in its political orientations (an assertion confirmed both by various data of public opinion polls and erendum results), thus enabling the integration of a number of oblasts into a single region. However, the outcomes of the 1994 presidential elections allow one to conclude that the population became differentiated in this region, where the choice between Leonid Kravchuk (the expresident) and Leonid Kuchma (the incumbent president) divided the population, as the voting confirmed, into Left Bank and Right Bank central subregions (with certain western Ukrainian and eastern Ukrainian orientations). A rise of the national intolerance index in Kiev is not statistically significant due to the small number of those polled (90 people) and the variability in individual assessments. As far as the dynamics of tolerance of Ukraine’s population towards various nationalities are concerned (Table 6), one can see that changes in opposite directions took place. Set against a background of a rather stable level of intolerance towards representatives of developed Western countries (Americans and Germans — here the changes are statistically insignificant), the general trends seems to be that intolerance towards ethnic groups living in Ukraine (Crimean Tatars, gypsies, Jews) decreased, while it rose with respect to Eastern European neighbours (Poles and Hungarians). Table 6 Dynamics of tolerance of Ukraine ‘s population towards various nationalities Nationalities Index of national intolerance (on a scale 1–7)   April 1992 N = 1752 May 1994 N= 1807 Change in index Ukrainians 1.55 1.83 +0.28** Russians 2.45 2.25 –0.20** Belarussians 2.85 2.70 –0.15* Jews 4.18 3.82 –0.36** Americans 4.31 4.42 +0.11 Poles 3.77 4.45 +0.68** Germans 4.43 4.48 +0.05 Crimean Tatars 5.09 4.55 –0.54** Slovaks – 4.55   Hungarians 4.24 4.59 +0.35** Moldavians – 4.59   Romanians 4.56 4.69 +0.13* Serbians – 4.77 – Georgians 5.26 4.86 –0.40** Turks – 4.91   Gypsies 5.55 5.09 –0.46** (* p < 0.05; **< 0.01) The rise in tolerance towards Georgians can be primarily explained by the fact that certain political forces in Ukraine actively supported the Georgian side in the GeorgianAbkhazian conflict (more specifically, many Ukraine’s citizens went on relief missions to Georgia in 1993–1994). Due to a rather wide proGeorgian propaganda campaign on the Ukrainian TV Channel UTAR and the involvement of a part of Ukraine’s population in the events in Georgia (family and friendly ties and contacts with people who supported the Georgian side), an increase in tolerance of Georgians occurred. 7. Dynamics of Relationships between Ukrainians and Ethnic Russians A rising national tolerance towards ethnic Russians and a declining tolerance towards Ukrainians are main trends in the development of relationships between Ukrainians and ethnic Russians (see Table 6). Table 7 gives the data characterizing regional peculiarities of dynamics of attitudes towards Ukrainians and ethnic Russians . Table 7 Dynamics of the Population ‘s Attitudes to Ukrainians and Ethnic Russians: Regional Peculiarities   Index of intolerance of Ukrainians Index of intolerance of Russians Regions 1992 1994 1992 1994 Kiev 1.67 1.65 2.17 2.08 the western region 1.37 1.75** 3.14 2.97 the central region 1.33 1.41 . 2.58 1.79** the eastern region 1.58 2.03** 2.05 2.24* the southern region 1.86 2.02 2.84 2.22** the Crimea 2.27 2.76 1.83 2.34* Ukraine 1.55 1.83** 2.45 2.25** *<0.05;**<001 Tolerance of Ukrainians significantly decreased in the eastern and western (!) regions of Ukraine — regions most sensitive to interethnic relations between ethnic Russians and Ukrainians. The same trend is characteristic of the southern region but because of a scattering of individual assessments these changes are statistically insignificant. These changes are, in our opinion, a lection of a disillusionment with the idea of national revival by way of isolationism and a greater orientation towards partnership with Russia. The most significant rise in tolerance of ethnic Russians occurred in the central and southern regions of Ukraine. The Crimea and the southern region showed a drop in tolerance both of Ukrainians and ethnic Russians, which lects the aggravation of the problem of RussianUkrainian relations precisely in this region. Linguistic policy (specifically, demands to institute Russian as the second official language in the country) may be a factor which contributed to the aggravation of the problem. Ukraine has a specific linguistic situation: there are important regional differences in the number of people using this or that language in everyday communication. Table 8 shows the data illustrating regional differences in the use of languages in everyday communication. Answers to the question “What language do you use for communication in your family?” were regarded as indicators of a perred language use. Table 8 Regional peculiarities of perred language use in family communication (May 1994; in percentage for each region) Regions “What language do you use for communication in your family?”   Only Ukrainian Only Russian Both, depending on circumstances Kiev 15 39 46 The western region 79 5 16 The central region 60 8 32 The eastern region ?C 53 35 The southern region 22 47 31 The Crimea 4 86 11 Ukraine 37 33 30 If on average in Ukraine the proportions of people who per to speak only Ukrainian or only Russian, as well as those who use both languages, are approximately the same, in each individual region one of the two languages is prevalent in family communication. In Kiev, almost half of its inhabitants use both languages. The central and especially western regions are mainly Ukrainianspeaking, while in the Crimea and in the eastern and southern regions Russian is obviously dominant. Theore, a hrefardline state language policy which stipulates that all official documents should be written in Ukrainian only cannot but evoke inner tension, especially in people who have a poor command of the only official language. Many people in these regions voted for Leonid Kuchma at the 1994 presidential election largely because his election program contained a promise to grant Russian the status of the second official language. Incidentally, orientation to strengthening economic ties with Russia was another important point in the program of the wouldbe president. The greater orientation of Ukraine’s population towards economic ties with Russia was brought about by improvements in Russia (as compared with Ukraine) in the two most important components of people’s living standards; higher average wages and a stronger currency unit (the purchasing power of the Russian rouble is higher in Ukraine than that of the Ukrainian coupon). It is precisely this factor which in our opinion played a decisive part in the electoral behaviour of the Central Left Bank subregion of Ukraine in the 1994 presidential elections. Under the present economic conditions in Ukraine, when wages cannot provide for a subsistence level, threequarters of Ukraine’s population (according to data of the sociological poll, conducted with the author’s participation in February 1991 by the sociological service of the Democratic Initiatives Centre), survive solely on products grown on personal plots of land attached to their houses (50% constantly, 25% periodically). Many people in the central region, especially in Left Bank Ukraine, per to sell products from their personal plots in Russia, because, as it has been noted, the purchasing power of the Russian rouble in Ukraine is higher than that of the Ukrainian coupon. Thus, the major reason for the rise in national tolerance of ethnic Russians lies, in our opinion, in the better economic situation in Russia as compared with Ukraine. The data obtained also made it possible to establish a significant link between the socioeconomic attitudes of people and their level of general national/ethnic tolerance. 8. Influence of SocioEconomic Orientations of Population on National/Ethnic Tolerance Put in its most general form, the interconnection between socioeconomic orientations and national tolerance is characterized by the following regularity: the more people are oriented towards market orms in the economy, the higher their national/ethnic tolerance level tends to be. As an example we can provide data that illustrate the interdependence between general attitude to economic orms and general national/ethnic tolerance index: those people who advocate a complete transition to a market economy have a lower index of general national/ethnic intolerance than those who would like to return to the socialist economy of the Brezhnev era of stagnation (see Table 9). Table 9 Influence of SocioEconomic Orientations on National/Ethnic Tolerance “What is your attitude to economic transformations in Ukraine?” Index of overall national intolerance (on a scale from 1–7) There must be a complete transition to the market economy 4.15 There must be only some individual orms 4.62 The country’s economy should be brought back to the state it was in at the beginning of the perestroika 4.61 A similar trend has been revealed in the analysis of the interdependence between national tolerance and other indicators of socioeconomic orientations. For example, national/ethnic tolerance is lower among those people who per low prices and the accompanying shortage of products and goods’ than in those who per ‘high prices and the accompanying sufficient supply of goods and food products’. National/ethnic tolerance is lower in those people who have negative attitudes towards business, entrepreneurship, private property, etc. On the basis of these data one can suggest that as a result of radical economic orms aimed at establishing private property and an improvement of Ukraine’s economic situation, the national/ethnic tolerance of its population will increase. The worsening of the economic situation may lead to a lower selftolerance of Ukraine’s population as just one form of selfrespect and confidence in its own strength and the feasibility of building its new state. 9. Main Conclusions 1. The values of indicators of national/ethnic tolerance of Ukraine’s adult population towards various nationalities and ethnic groups testify to the fact that in the First stage of making a new independent nation, a striving for national and state isolationism was an essential element of the mass consciousness. The urge for separateness manifested itself in the fact that the population’s attitude was most tolerant mainly towards those ethnic groups/nationalities which, historically, lived on the territory of Ukraine. Most nationalities/ethnic groups are shifted by the mass consciousness along the scale of social distance beyond the mark of close contacts. The greatest suspiciousness and guardedness is displayed with respect to those nationalities/ethnic groups whose image is somehow associated, to a greater or lesser extent, with interethnic or international conflicts. 2. Manifestations of intolerance (nonacceptance) towards some specific nationality or ethnic group are a special case of manifestation of a more general national xenophobia (distrust and suspiciousness with respect to all ‘aliens’). Theore, if someone is intolerant of one nationality or ethnic group, he/she is very likely to be intolerant to all other nationalities or ethnic groups which he/she does not consider as ‘friendly’. 3. The level of general national/ethnic tolerance increased somewhat in the first two years (1992–1994) of Ukraine’s independence and this may be an indication of positive, albeit slow trends in changes of mass consciousness on the way to an open democratic society. The most noticeable dynamics of general national/ethnic tolerance were registered in the central region of Ukraine, which lects overall changes in the minds of people in this region. These changes are in line with the increase of this region’s role in the general political situation in Ukraine. 4. In 1992–1994, important changes occurred in the system of relationships between Ukrainians and ethnic Russians: the population’s tolerance towards Ukrainians went down (even in the western region), while it went up with respect to ethnic Russians. In our opinion, this can be explained by the disillusionment of Ukraine’s population with the idea of national revival by way of isolationism (brought about by the lowering of living standards and quality of life) as well as by the strengthening of orientations towards economic ties and cooperation with Russia. Russia’s advantages in the economic sphere (as compared with Ukraine) are a major factor of changes in the system of relationships between Ukrainians and ethnic Russians. The pace of economic orms in Russia is higher than in Ukraine and hence a) the higher level of average wages in Russia b) the higher purchasing power of the Russian rouble on the territory of Ukraine. The following are, in our opinion, the main factors which can lead to a hrefigher level of national/ethnic tolerance among Ukraine’s population: a) real economic orms (above all, a definitive legislative support of private property accompanied by social protection and maintenance of the disabled and senior citizens) and, in this connection, greater socioeconomic orientations of the population towards the market economy, which are in turn closely connected with greater democratic orientations towards an open society; b) a flexible linguistic policy in the field of official language, taking into account regional peculiarities related to predominantly used languages of communication. The decline in living standards and quality of life are key factors which may negatively influence not only general national/ethnic tolerance but also tolerance of Ukrainians (including Ukrainians’ selftolerance). A further decline in living standards (especially to the limit when even the highest official salary or wages are considerably less than the subsistence level) will inevitably lead not only to a lower confidence in power structures but also to disbelief in one’s own strength and capabilities. In such a situation a reverse movement of the people towards socialist ‘values’: ‘antimarket’ orientations, ‘witch hunts for enemies of the people’ (who are allegedly responsible for low living standards), an increase in suspicion with respect to all ‘aliens’, and theore intolerance. [1] Reprinted with permission from Klaus Segbers/Stephan De Spiegeleire (Eds.) PostSoviet Puzzles. Mapping the Political Economy of the Former Soviet Union (Vol. IV), pp. 101–122. aNomos Verlagsgesellschaft, BadenBaden 1995. [2] Popper, K. Otkrytoe obshchestvo і ego vragi [Open Society and Its Enemies]. Moskva: Kultumayalnitsiativa, 1992. – Vols. 1&2. [3] Park, R.E. “The Concept of Social Distance.” Journal of Applied Sociology 8 (1924): 339–344; Bogardus,E.S. “Measuring Social Distance.” Journal of Applied Sociology 9 (1925): 299–308. [4] For applications of this method in ethnosociological research, see Ktsoyeva, G.U. “Metody izucheniya etnicheskikh stereotipov” [Methods of Studying Ethnic Stereotypes]. In Sosialnaya PsikhologiyaObshchestvennayaPraktika[Social Psychology and Social Practice] 1985: 225–231; Koltsov, V.B. “Sotsialnaya distantsiya vmezhnatsionainom obshchenii: opyt postroyeniya integrainogo pokazatelya [Social Distance in Interethnic Communication: An Attempt to Devise an Integral Index].” Sofsiologhicheskiye Issledovaniya [Sociological Studies]a href 2 (1989): 26–29;Pantic, D.“Nacionaina Distanca Gradana Jugoslavije.” In Jugoslavija nakriznojprekpelnici. Beograd:IDNCPIJMa href (1991): 168–186. [5] Golovakha, E. and N. Panina “Interethnic Relations and Ethnic Tolerance in Ukraine.” Jews ansJewish Topics in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 14(1991): 27–30; Golovakha, E.I., N.V. Panina, and N.N. Churilov. Kiev 1990–1991. Solsiologhicheskiye Reportazhi [Kiev 19901991: Sociological Reports]. Kiev: Naukova Durnka (1992), 129pp.

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